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has elapsed since Wisconsin in 1937 became the first
state to adopt a labor relations act. Since then no fewer than

forty-two states have-passed legislation affecting industrial relations and labor organizations. Ten of these states have adopted labor relations laws comparable to the federal statutes of 1935, and 19472 The
others singled out some specific problems which have been dealt with on
more of a piecemeal basis. The fact that such a large number of states
have seen fit to regulate aspects of labor union activity indicates a widespread belief on the part of state legislators that an overriding public interest is involved in labor-management relations. Certainly there has at
no time been such widespread legislation in this field among the states.
The Wagner Act was designed to give more nearly equal rights to management and to labor by limiting the activities of the former when they
transgressed the rights of labor, as they so frequently had. But the common and statute law relating to form of organization, admission and expulsion of members, and related matters were still regarded as within the
proper province of the states except in so far as the regulation of interstate
commerce and the granting of restraining orders by the federal courts
were concerned. The behavior of unions in the use of pickets, the boycott,
etc., was otherwise left to the states, where it then was. Moreover, a
dosed-shop proviso found in Section 8 (3) of the Wagner Act took its
form in order to leave state laws undisturbed as much as possible.
The imposition of unfair labor practices upon management and requiring an employer to bargain collectively with the majority representative
of his employees could of course have been expected to serve as an invita* The analysis herein made was undertaken in conjunction with a study of measures in the
Congress culminating in the adoption of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947. Grateful acknowledgment is made by the authors to the staff of the Review for assistance rendered
in the preparation of this article.
t Chairman emeritus of the Department of Economics, University of Chicago, and formerly
Chairman of the National Labor Relations Board.
Member of the Illinois Bar.
'National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. § 1i et seq. (1942).
2Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. (1947).
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tion to regulate unions in respect to their responsibilities and conduct.
Indeed, such legislation had been proposed at the hearings on the Wagner
Bill but had not been adopted. However, after unions had been greatly
strengthened by the federal act, which was designed to, and did, encourage
collective bargaining, the states themselves set about defining the obligations and restricting the activities of labor unions. It is interesting to note
that from the great mass of state legislation came many of the provisions
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. Congressmen had not
been unaware of what had been transpiring in their home states. Moreover, they were susceptible to the same pressures which had resulted in
legislation in their constituencies.
The year 1937 saw the emergence of "Baby Wagner Acts" which guaranteed to employees the right to organize, to join or assist labor unions
and to bargain collectively. These protective statutes were designed to encourage organization and collective bargaining. The year 1939, however,
witnessed a reversal in this trend, with the adoption in certain key states
of statutes designed to restrict employee activities and union methods,
even while sometimes accompanied by less stringent prohibitions against
employer unfair labor practices. The 1943 sessions of the state legislatures
resulted in a great volume of labor legislation, and, notably, the beginning
of widespread regulation of the organization, "internal affairs" and procedures of labor unions. The banner year in state labor legislation was,
however, 1947, when thirty states enacted statutes regulating or restricting union activities. Public reaction to the post-war strike wave resulted
in the adoption in eleven states of laws regulating disputes in public utilities, the banning in six states of strikes by public employees, as well as a
large body of legislation seeking to obviate "unnecessary strikes"--such
as those resulting from jurisdictional disputes-and to limit the area of
labor disputes by prohibiting secondary boycotts and by restricting
picketing and other strike activity. It was in 1947 also that the movement
for prohibiting or regulating union security agreements reached its peak,
with fourteen states adopting legislation of this type.
It is notable that the bulk of the regulatory legislation during the last
decade, and especially in the earlier forties, was to be found not so much
in the great industrial states of the East and of the Middle West as in the
relatively non-industrial areas of the nation. Thus the great wave of anticlosed-shop legislation has been found without exception in predominantly. agrarian, non-industrialized states, where collective bargaining and
union security provisions are relatively infrequently found. The states
legislating, and the communities within them, have generally been active-
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ly interested in furthering industrialization, but nevertheless generally
reacted against the resulting "labor troubles" which more or less inevitably developed. Unquestionably there was also some feeling that if they
could succeed in keeping unions out, industry would be attracted in. Frequently "yankee" management has sought to rid itself of problems connected with unionism and to profit from the reduced costs to be obtained
from lower wages and the not infrequent subsidies to be had from relocating or expanding into southern or other non-union territory. Established
unions, like the Textile Workers, have, of course, foreseen only loss from
the consequent unequal competition, followed by labor disorganization,
and have sought to extend their organization to the new territory. Hence,
considerable conflict has developed in these semi-industrial states, in
which farmers and businessmen generally can be expected to join forces
against unions. Such states, and the hinterland in the more industrialized
areas, have largely constituted the "industrial frontier" in which union
organization and union procedures have been and are giving rise to much
of the so-called anti-union legislation.
While the common law and early statutes regarding union activity are
not the subjects of this study, they should not be entirely forgotten. There
was of course law governing strikes, picketing and boycotts even before
state legislators became interested in the subject. But a tremendous
amount of legislation has been enacted during the last ten years to cope
with presumed problems arising in the field of industrial relations. This
has codified, modified, amended and greatly extended the rudimentary
law which the courts, municipalities and earlier state legislatures had
created.
Of the statutes enacted in the field of labor relations during the last
decade, the most comprehensive have taken the form of labor relations
acts administered by state boards or commissions. These ambitious attempts at enunciating a public policy regarding industrial relations will be
the first subject of inquiry. Following this, a cross-section view will be
taken of all the labor relations legislation enacted during the past decade
-piecemeal enactments as well as the broader statutes-first, to examine
the extent of regulation of certain union methods and then, finally, to
analyze that body of legislation regulating the union organization itself.
PUBLIC POLICY EXPRESSED IN STATE LABOR RELATIONS ACTS
The most comprehensive formulation of public policy regarding collective bargaining and union activity is found in the ten states which have
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adopted labor relations acts. 3 These laws proclaim a policy of peaceful industrial relations and grant employees the right to collective bargaining.
At the same time, each sets up an orderly procedure for the selection of a
bargaining representative. The acts set forth provisions by which the
public policy is to be effectuated, and a labor relations board or commission is established to make the policy effective.
The first state to adopt such legislation was Wisconsin, 4 whose Baby
Wagner Act was passed soon after the constitutionality of its federal
prototype had been upheld by the Supreme Court. In rapid order, in the
same year, similar statutes were passed in four other states-Massachusetts,s New York,6 Pennsylvania7 and Utah.' Although like enactments
were expected in many other states, ten years later only New York still
had on its books its little Wagner Act substantially unmodified, all the
rest of the states mentioned having joined the movement toward "equalization" and more extensive union controls. Subsequently only two other
states-Rhode Island in 19419 and Connecticut in I945X' -- adopted Baby

Wagner Acts. In many other states such bills were introduced but failed
to pass. For example, in the single year of 1945, when Connecticut adopted
a statute modeled on the Wagner Act, it is reported that such measures
were introduced, but died in the legislative hoppers of five other states.
Since 1939, when Wisconsin repealed,"" and Pennsylvania drastically
4
3
amended,12 her Baby Wagner Act, and Minnesota and Michigan
passed labor relations acts, the trend in state enactments has been rather
steadily away from the protective type of labor law and towards legislation which restricts rather than enlarges labor's "rights." The acts generally watered down the employer unfair labor practices found in the
3Colorado, z943; Connecticut, 1945; Massachusetts, 1937; Michigan, 1939; Minnesota,
1939; New York, 1937; Pennsylvania, 1937; Rhode Island, i945; Utah, 1937; Wisconsin, 1937.

While the Kansas statute of 1943 and the Delaware enactment of 1947 are fairly extensive in
scope, it is not felt that they properly fall under the heading of labor relations acts. The use
of that term is here confined to acts administered by labor relations boards or commissions.
4 Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § iii.oi et seq.
s Mass. Ann. Laws (1942) c. i5oA, § r et seq.
6 New York Labor Law (McKinney, i94o) art. 20.
7Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 211.1 et seq.
s Utah Rev. Stat. Ann. (1943) § 49-I-9 et seq.
9R.I. Gen. Laws (1941) c. io66.
1O
Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1945) § 9 33h et seq.
"sWis. Stat. (Brossard, 1937) § iii.oi et seq., repealed by Wis. L. (1939) c. 57.
12Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, §§ 211.1-211.13.
13 Minn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.oi et seq.
'4 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. 1946) § 17.454-1 et seq.
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federal statutes, if, indeed, they included them at all. At the same time
they usually "equalized" the act by including employee and union unfair
labor practices. This type of statute has been adopted de novo or by
amendment in Wisconsin, 5 Pennsylvania,"6 Minnesota,1 Michigan 8 and
Colorado.'9 A most significant and characteristic feature of most of the restrictive acts is that the right of employees specifically includes, not only
the right to engage in self-organization and collective bargaining, but also
the right to refrain from doing so-which was, of course, always implicit.
It was in the Wisconsin Employment Peace Act of r939 that this provision, which has been embodied in the Taft-Hartley Act,2 0 first found expression.2 ' Minnesota denied the benefits of the protection of her Act to
any employee, employer or labor organization violating any of its provisions.22 Wisconsin 3 and Colorado4 did the same but left it to the board's
discretion as to whether it would suspend the union's "rights, immunities,
privileges or remedies" under the law for a period not exceeding one year.
Representation procedure is provided in all of the ten labor relations acts,
establishing an orderly method for the selection of a bargaining representative for an appropriate unit. An important departure from the
NLRA procedure is found in four of the states with restrictive statutesColorado,25 Minnesota, 6 Pennsylvania7 and Wisconsin ' -where
the
board's certification of a bargaining agent is made subject to judicial review. Such an amendment to the NLRA was considered recently by the
Congress, but was not included in the Taft-Hartley Act after Chairman
Herzog had argued that with a provision like this, "Employers interested
in delay and minority unions disgruntled at the result of an election could
postpone collective bargaining indefinitely."' 9 In these four states the em"5Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1937 )§ iii.oi et seq., repealed by Wis. L. (1939) C. 5716Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, §§ 211.1-211.13.
17 Minn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.o1 et seq.
is Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. 1946) § 17.454-1 et seq.
29 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. z946) c. 97, § 94(1) et seq.
20 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 (1947).
2rWis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § 111.04.
Minn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.15.
Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § 11.02(3).
'4 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) C. 97, § 94(8)(4).
2sIbid., at § 94(5)(3).
26 This seems to have been the practice in Minnesota even though there is no express
statutory authorization.
"7Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1946) tit. 43, § 219(b).
23Wis.
Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § 111.os(3). This seems also to be the effect of an amendment in Rhode Island. R.I. Acts (1942) C. 1247, § 8(4).
9 Statement before Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, March 6, x947.
23Wis.
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ployer has the same right as a union to petition the board for representation proceedings, which means that he can force an election where "a
question concerning representation" is found to exist. The danger of permitting an unlimited employer right to petition for an election has always
been that the employer might foreclose the possibility of successful organization by a premature petition filed before the union has had time fully
to organize the plant or during a period of temporary dissatisfaction with
the union, perhaps brought about by the calculated recalcitrance of the
employer himself. Wisconsin 30 and Colorado 3x allow their boards no opportunity to exercise judgment and discretion in designating the unit appropriate for collective bargaining, but make the decision turn solely on
the desires of the employees expressed by secret ballot.
As regards procedures, the state labor relations acts fall into three
basic types. Under one type, which is patterned on the Wagner Act, administration of the statute is lodged in an administrative agency, to which
is delegated the functions of investigation, prosecution, and adjudication.
A safeguard is always contained against arbitrary action, however, since
the agency must go into an appropriate state court to seek enforcement
of its order unless voluntary compliance is obtained. Moreover, redress is
purely remedial, never punitive. "The most conspicuous attributes of
these administrative boards," Chairman Herzog of the NLRB has written, "are preliminary investigation by state employees [of charges filed],
the encouragement of settlements between the parties consistent with the
policies of the acts, the winnowing out of weak or frivolous cases which
might otherwise be pressed to hearing by over-zealous private litigants,
the elimination of protracted hearings wherever possible, and the evolution of a unified governmental policy on labor relations. " 32 Five states
34
now utilize the administrative technique-Massachusetts,33 New York,
35 Rhode Island 36 and ConnecticutY7
Utah,
39
A second group of states-Pennsylvania,"8 Wisconsin and Colorado40
3o Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § iiI.O5(2).
31 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) C. 97, § 94(5)(3).
32Herzog, The Labor Relations Acts of the States, 224 Annals
33Mass.

Ann. Laws (1942) C.IoA, §§ 6, 7.
34 New York Labor Law (McKinney, 294o) art.

20,

§ 7o6.

3sUtah Code Ann. (1943) § 42-1-6(5).

36 R.I. Gen. Laws (i94) C. xo66, § 3(7).
37 Conn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1945) §§ 939h, 9 4oh.
38 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1940) tit. 43, §211.9.
39Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § 1110.7.
40 Colo.

Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) C.97, § 94(8) (I4).

1g, 22 (942).
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-utilize a quasijudicial technique. These state boards make no attempt
to investigate charges or to effect voluntary settlements before a hearing
which follows a charge as a matter of course. The theory is that the complaints are primarily matters of private rather than public concern. Hence,
the burden of proving a charge is thrown upon the charging party rather
than being undertaken by the board's legal staff. Since the right involved
is considered to be a private one, the parties may withdraw the charges
at will whether or not the purposes of the act are thereby served. The
board's function is merely to act as the court of first resort. Under the
Colorado statute an alternative procedure is provided, however, under
which the commission can initiate complaints, but it is not clear whether
the commission is empowered to, or will, engage in preliminary investigation or in prosecution. Redress in these three states is remedial, except
that Colorado permits an additional or alternative punitive action.
The third group of states havihg labor relations acts-Michigan4' and
Minnesota2-utilize the established judicial system for the abatement of
unfair labor practices. 41 The state board is not authorized to take any action to prevent or remedy the commission of unfair labor practices designated in the statutes. Such action is placed wholly within the province of
the courts, and for this reason these states have been said to utilize "the
court technique." The commission of an unfair labor practice is made a
misdemeanor under the Michigan statute44 and, as in Colorado,4 made
punishable by fine or imprisonment. Minnesota provides injunctive relief. 46 It should be noted that a discriminatorily-discharged employee in

these states can invoke only the statutory penalty, whereas under the
statutes utilizing the administrative or quasijudicial organization the employee can secure reinstatement with back pay. The result is that relatively little incentive has existed for prosecution. The regular law enforcement officer is nominally charged with prosecution under the statute. The
action is brought in the appropriate court of general jurisdiction and the
usual judicial procedure, including jury trial, is followed. While the preceding groups of states expedite cases in the courts arising under the state
41 Under a recent amendment to the Michigan statute the board is authorized to itself
pursue legal or equitable remedies for any act in violation of the statute. Mich. Pub. Acts
(1947) P.A. 318, § 22a.
42 Minn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.14.
43 This is of course the enforcement procedure provided in all of the states which have piecemeal labor legislation but do not have labor relations acts.
44 Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. 1946) §§ I7.454-IS, i7.
4s Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, §§ 94(14), (23).
46Minn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.14.
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labor relation act, no priority is given to such litigation by Michigan or
Minnesota. Under the administrative type of statute, remedies can be
tailored to correct the violation. In states which utilize the court technique, however, remedy lies in damages secured in private civil actions or
in criminal prosecution. Since there has been little incentive to secure
either, it appears that there has, as a consequence, been little enforce47
ment of these acts.
Two types of jurisdictional clauses appear among the state labor relations acts. The first is the so-called restricted jurisdictional clause, embodied in the Pennsylvania act 48 prior to 1943, and the Massachusetts 49
and Connecticut5o acts before 1947, under which the state board's jurisdiction runs only to those cases not falling within the jurisdiction of the
NIRB. In order to create concurrent jurisdiction over domestically
housed interstate industries, however, all of these states now extend
their acts beyond merely those employers engaged solely in intrastate
commerce. These distinctions have, however, probably been rendered
moot by the Supreme Court's decision in the Allegheny Ludlum cases" and
the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act,52 both of which narrowly confine
the power of state boards. It was of course always true that even those
state boards possessed of concurrent jurisdiction had to withdraw in the
face of the NLRB,which had superior rights under the commerce and
supremacy clauses of the Constitution. Until recently, however, state
boards having concurrent jurisdiction acted when the NLRB did not. It
is probably the law now that in those cases where the employer's operations affect interstate commerce a state board can act only where the
NLRB cedes jurisdiction to it. And the national board is permitted to do
this only where the policies of the two boards are consistent. Of course a
state board operating under a restricted jurisdictional clause is by statute
without jurisdiction over employers engaged in interstate commerce. Under a recent amendment to the Massachusetts act, the state board may
not act, in the case of an employer subject to the NLRA,"unless the federal agency ....has declined to assert jurisdiction thereof, or except
47 This is the conclusion reached in an able study by Professor Killingsworth, The Labor
Relations Acts of the States: A Study in Public Policy, being published by the University of
Chicago Press.
48Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1946) tit. 43, § 211.3(c).
49 Mass. Ann. Laws (1942) C. i5oA, § io(b).
soConn. Gen. Stat. (Supp. 1945) §9 33h(6).

s, Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp. v. Kelley, 67 S.Ct. 1026 (i947); Bethlehem Steel Co. v.
New York State Labor Relations Board, 67 S.Ct. 1026 (i947). These cases, which were decided together, are discussed in a note, infra.
S229 U.S.C.A. § i6o(a).
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where such federal agency has conceded to the commission jurisdiction
over any such case or proceedings."' 3 A similar amendment was made in
54
1947 to the Connecticut Labor Relations act.
THE REGULATION OF UNION METHODS
With this reference to the adoption and amendment of the industrial
relations acts, we turn now to consider the entire body of state labor relations legislation, including both piecemeal enactments and the comprehensive statutes, as they affect particular union methods. Legislation concerning union security provisions, coercion of non-union workers, picketing, boycotts, strikes, breach of contract and political actioh has been
widespread. Such laws have been found in some states in statutes which
regulate this or that aspect of labor activity. They have also been found
in the labor relations acts, often added by subsequent amendment. At this
point an attempt will be made to present a cross-section view of the state
legislation adopted in the last decade regulating certain important union
methods.
UNION SECURITY PROVISIONS
The Taft-Hartley Act specifically provides what has been the law in
fact since 1935: that where state law prohibits union security agreements,
it shall control.'An unsympathetic source has defined union security as "organized labor's method of gaining the assistance of the employer in the task of providing and keeping employee support for the union." s6 A spokesman for
organized labor would probably define it as a method by which all employees who enjoy the benefits of unionism, in terms of higher pay and
better working conditions, share the expense of maintaining the labor organization. In addition to this, he would probably call attention to the
more harmonious relations between the workers, and would certainly emphasize the need of a check on employer discrimination.
Achievement of the closed shop has been a main objective of most
strongly organized American local and international unions. This is in
contrast with the situation today in England and Sweden where unionsecurity provisions are comparatively unknown, largely because of the
general acceptance of unionism by management and the common practice of non-unionists to side with unionists in strike situations. As of 1946,
an estimated 7,400,000 workers in the United States were covered by
S Mass. Acts (1947) c. 657, § io(b).

54Conn.Spec. L. (1947) P.A. 175, § 933h(6).
s 29 U.S.C.A. § 64(b).

s6 9 N.A.M.

Law Digest

32

(1946).
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closed- or union-shop agreements, and an additional 3,6oo,ooo were covered by maintenance-of-membership provisions.57
The peak of the anti-closed shop legislative drive was reached in 1947
when twelve states passed statutes banning or limiting the use of some or
all union security devices. This brought the total number of such states to
eighteen. The bulk of these statutes fall into two easily 'distinguished
groups. Those in the first group, of which there are fourteen in all58 flatly
proscribe all, or some, types of union-security agreements. The Georgia
statute is typical. Its basic provision is that "No individual shall be required as a condition of employment, or of continuance of employment,
to be or remain a member or an affiliate of a labor organization ...... ,,s9
A number of these statutes also expressly provide that disciplinary expulsion from a union shall not be a basis for discharge, and this is probably
implied where not expressed. Most either implicitly or expressly forbid, or
declare to be against public policy and thus unenforceable, agreements between employers and labor organizations which make membership in a
labor organization in any way a condition of employment. The statute in
Maine prohibits closed-shop contracts but, however, permits the making
of agreements for the union-shop. The New Hampshire law prohibiting a
union-security agreement applies only to employers having five or fewer
employees. Five states now have constitutional amendments banning all
types of union security provisions, which generally provide "that the right
to work shall not be denied or abridged because of membership or nonmembership in a labor union. ' '6 ° It should be noted that "right to work"
S7Extent of Collective Bargaining and Union Recognition, 1946, 64 Monthly Lab. Rev.
765, 766-67 (1946)ssAriz. L. (1947) c. 8i (enforcement statute for 1946 constitutional amendment); Ark.
Acts (1947) c. 1oi (enforcement statute for x944 constitutional amendment); Fla. Const.
Declaration of Rights, amendment of § 12 (1944); Ga. L. (1947) No. x4o (operation specifically
made retroactive); Iowa Acts (1947) c. 296; Me. L. (1947) c. 395, to appear as §41-A of Me.
Rev. Stat. (bans the closed shop but permits the union shop, thus extending the general provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act to Maine employers engaged in intrastate commerce); Neb. L.

(i947) No. 344 (enforcement statute for Neb. Const. Art.iS,

§§

i3-z5); N.H. L. (i947)

c. 194 (bans closed shop for employers of five or less employees); N.C. L. (i947) c. 328, 19
L.R.R.M. 3029 (operation said to be prospective only); N.D. L. (r947) c. 243 (operation suspended by filing of petition for referendum); S.D. L. (i945) C.8o (enforcement statute of 1945
constitutional amendment); Tenn. Pub. Acts (1947) c. 36 (operation stated to be prospective
only); Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. St. (Vernon, 1947) art. 5207a (operation stated to be prospective

only); Va. Acts (1947) C. 2 (operation stated to be prospective only). An Alabama statute
seems to forbid union-security agreements, but the Alabama Supreme Court in a recent decision
rejected this construction. Hotel &Restaurant EmployeesInternational Alliance v. Greenwood,
30 So. 2d 696 (Ala., 1947).
£9 Ga. L. (1947) No. 140, § 2.
60 These states are Arkansas, Arizona, Florida, Nebraska and South Dakota. See note 58
supra. A constitutional amendment of this type has been proposed by the New Mexico legislature and will be 'oted on at the next general election.
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statutes and amendments are a double-edged sword: the employer can
neither discriminate against an employee because he is or is not a member
of a labor organization.
The sanctions erected against violation are somewhat diversified. Misdemeanor penalties are expressly provided for in the Arkansas, Georgia,
Iowa, Nebraska, South Dakota and Tennessee statutes, varying from a
minimum of a $500 fine in Nebraska to a maximum of $i,ooo and twelve
months on a chain gang in Georgia. In Arkansas any person, corporation
or association making a contract in violation of the act may be fined not
less than $ioo nor more than $5,ooo for each offense, and each day the unlawful contract is in effect is deemed a separate offense. Seven states permit imprisonment for violations. Arizona, Georgia and Iowa have given
"the remedy of injunction .... to any individual whose employment is
affected, or may be affected, by any [union-security] contract."' Violators of these acts, who may be either unions or employers, are expressly
made civilly liable to all persons damaged by the operation of the illegal
agreement in Arizona, Georgia, North Carolina and Virginia. In North
Carolina a union-security agreement is made "an illegal combination or
conspiracy in restraint of trade,"' 2 and in Virginia "an illegal combination
or conspiracy. ' 6 3 These classifications in those two states carry with them
6
all three sanctions-civil and criminal liability, and injunction. 4
A second type of statute, while not proscribing all union security provisions, permits such agreements only where they have been validated by
a referendum among the employees concerned. Wisconsin pioneered in
such a procedure in 1939.65 Between that time and the adoption of the
Taft-Hartley Act, which includes such a provision,66 Colorado6 Kansas68
and New Hampshire 69 enacted statutes stemming from the same basic
theory. The core of the Wisconsin-type statute is the requirement of a
referendum to determine whether a specified proportion of the employees
in the unit wish to give their elected bargaining agent authority to negoti61Ga.

L. (947) No.

o
14 ,

§ 8.

62N.C. L. (i947) C. 328, § 2.
63

Va. Acts

(1947) C. 2, § 2.

N.C. Gen. Stat. (Michie, 1943) §§ 75-1, 75-14 through 75-z6; Va. Code Ann. (Michie,
1942) §§ 4722(9), (vi) and (14).
6sWis. Stat. (Brossard, i945) §§ III.02(9), 1110.4 and Iii.o6(i)(c).
66 29 U.S.C.A. § i58(a)(3) (1947).
67 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, §§ 94(I)(4), 94(2)(7), 94(6)(c), 94(7)(I)
94(16) and 94(27).
68Kan. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, Supp. 1945) § 44.8o3, 44.8og(4) and (5).
6
9 N.H. L. (1947) C. 194, amendment of N.H. Rev. Laws (942) C. 212, § 22.
64
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ate a union-security agreement with the employer.7 0 Of course, the mere
authorization of such an agreement in an employee referendum is but a
preliminary step in the attainment of a union shop; it must still be voluntarily granted by the employer at the bargaining table. Under the terms
of the 1939 Wisconsin statute, the union security agreement had to be
authorized by a vote of three-fourths of all the employees. In 1945 the required majority was reduced to two-thirds of those voting, subject, however, to a 1943 amendment which required that this constitute a majority of all the employees. 7' The 1943 amendment also provided for a new
referendum at the request of either party to the agreement, subject to a
finding by the board that "there is reasonable ground to believe that there
exists a change in the attitude of the employees concerned toward the allunion agreement ..... "7
,2If the referendum does not result in the necessary majority, the union-security provision is considered terminated at
the expiration of the contract of which it is then a part or at the end of one
year from the date of the announcement by the board of the result of the
referendum, whichever proves to be the earlier date. Another important
provision of the Wisconsin statute requires the state board to declare any
union-security agreement terminated where it finds "that the labor organization involved has unreasonably refused to receive as a member any
3
employee of such employer."7
The Colorado statute, passed in 1943, is similar to the 1939 Wisconsin statute. Thus, it requires a three-fourths vote to authorize a union-security agreement 7 4 and provides no machinery for reopening the question.
The application of the proviso has not, however, been extended to maintenance-of-membership provisions as in Wisconsin. The Kansas statute
requires merely a majority vote to authorize an all-union agreement.75
Both the Colorado and Kansas statutes forbid undemocratic membership
policies by unions76 The New Hampshire statute combines both types of
union security legislation. It absolutely forbids such agreements in the
case of employers having five or fewer employees.77 Such an agreement
can be entered into by an employer of more than five employees if sup70 This goes beyond the requirements of the original National Labor Relations Act's unionsecurity restrictions. It simply required that the bargaining union not be employer-dominated
and that it be the free choice of a majority of the employees in the unit. 49 Stat. 452 (935),
29 U.S.C.A. §§ 158(2) and (3) (1947).
7'Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § rir.o6(i) (c).
72Ibid.
I' Tbid.
74 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1946) c. 97, § 94(6)(c).
7SKan.
Gen. Stat. (Corrick, Supp. i945) §§ 44.8o3, 44.8og(4) and (s).
76 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, 1946) c. 97, § 94(I)(4); Kan. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, Supp. z945)

§44.8o.
77 N.H.

L. (1947) c. 194, § 21.
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ported by a two-thirds majority of the employees voting, where it is also a
majority of all the employees. Union-security contracts are required to include clauses providing that the labor organization shall practice no arbitrary discrimination in its membership policy and give members suspended or expelled a right of appeal through organization channels to the state
labor commissioner, whose decision is binding on the union. 78 A recent
amendment to the Massachusetts Labor Relations Act forbids an employer to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee for nonmembership in a labor union having a closed-shop agreement with the
employer, unless the union certifies that the employee was deprived of
membership because of a bona fide occupational disqualification or in the
administration of discipline. 71 The act sets up a procedure by which the
labor relations commission can determine whether an employee has been
unlawfully suspended or expelled or refused membership in the union.8
The Delaware law exempts controversies over union security provisions
from its definition of a labor dispute."'
THE CHECK-OFF

The check-off is an arrangement whereby the employer deducts union
dues or assessments from the employees' earnings and delivers the sum
total to the union. The check-off may be automatic, requiring the deduction to be made regardless of the wishes of the individual employee, or it
may be voluntary, permitting such deduction only upon an authorization
by the individual employee. It was estimated that 6,ooo,ooo workers were
covered by check-off provisions in 1946, of which slightly more than half
provided for the automatic type. 8 2 Three states-Colorado, 83 Pennsylvania 4 and Wisconsin'S-have outlawed the automatic or compulsory
check-off by declaring it to be an employer unfair labor practice. These
same states, however, legalize the voluntary check-off where the employer
obtains a written order therefor signed by the employee. Similar provi78Ibid., at § 21-aIII-IV.
79 Mass. Acts (1947) c. 657, added as § 6A to c. i5oA of Mass. Ann. Laws.
so Ibid.

81
Del. L. (i947) C. 196, § x(1)(3).
8

2Extent of Collective Bargaining and Union Recognition, 1946, 64 Monthly Lab. Rev.
765, 768 (1946).
83Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) C. 97, § 94(6) (1) (i).
8

4Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, z94i) tit. 43, § 2xi.6(i)(b).
5 Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § i i i.o6 (i) (i).

8
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sions also exist in Georgia,86 Arkansas, 7 Delaware,88 Rhode Island 89 and
Texas. 90 The check-off is permitted in Iowa only on the written request of
the employee, countersigned by the spouse, and is revocable on thirty
days' notice, 91 while in Georgia it is revocable at will. 92 Pennsylvania requires approval by majority vote of the employees in the bargaining unit
before even the voluntary check-off is permissible.93
WORK PERMITS

Under the work permit fee system non-union men pay a stipulated sum
to the union for the privilege of working on a closed-shop job when the
union is unable to provide all the men needed. Those eleven states outlawing the closed shop have thereby obviated the raison d'etre of the work
permit system. Selling work permit cards has specifically been made illegal
in Alabama, 94 Delaware, 95 Iowa, 96 Massachusetts, 9 New York 98 and
Texas. 99 Iowa, x°° New Hampshire,oI North Carolina,I02 Tennessee 0 3 and
Virginia o4 make it unlawful to require any person to pay a fee or assess-

ment to a union as a condition of employment.
COERCIVE TACTICS

Though by no means general, the history of the American labor movement has been replete with violence on the industrial scene. Such tactics
by unions have, however, always been subject to the criminal law. There
has been no love lost between the union worker and his non-union colleague-endearingly known in the trade as a "scab"-and the latter has
86Ga. L. (1947) No. 14o, § 6, i9 L.R.R.M. 3052.
97 Ark. Acts (1947) C. I01, ig L.R.R.M. 3029.
89 Del. L. (1947) c. 196, § 4(b), i9 L.R.R.M. 3055. Only "a court of competent jurisdiction"
can authorize a check-off under this section.
s9 See Acee, State Labor Legisfation in 1947, 65 Monthly Lab. Rev. i, 7 (1947).
90 Tex. L. (1947) H.B. 22, 20 L.R.R.M. 3023.
9' Iowa Acts (I947) S.B. 109, § 5, 20 L.R.R.M. 3007.
92Ga. L. (1947) No. i4o, § 6, i 9 L.R.R.M. 3052.
93Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 211.6(1)(b).
94

Ala. Gen. Acts (1943) 257, § IS.

95Del. L. (1947) c. 196, § 2o, 19 L.R.R.M. 3058.

96Iowa Acts (1947) S.B. io9, § 4, 2o L.R.R.M. 3007.
97 Mass. Ann. Laws (Supp. 1946), c. 149, § isob.
99 See People v. Fay, 182 N.Y. Misc. 358, 43 N.Y.S. 2d 826 (1943).
99 Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1946) tit. 83, art. 554a , § 8a.
zoo Iowa Acts (1947) C. 296, § 4.
10,N.H. L. (1947) c. 194, § 21.
102N.C. L. (947) C. 328, § 5.

Xo3Tenn. Pub. Acts (1947) S.B. 367, § 3.
104

Va. L. (1947) C. 2, § 5.
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in recent years been singled out for special legislative protection. The
forerunner of much of this legislation was a Washington law of i909 which
declared it to be a gross misdemeanor for two or more persons "to pre,vent another from exercising any lawful trade or calling, or from doing
any lawful act, by force, threats or intimidation or by interfering or threatening to interfere with any tools, implements or property belonging to or
used by another, or with the use of for] employment thereof.'"1°5 Sixteen
states now by statute have specifically prohibited the intimidation of nonunion workers.""6 Ten states, principally in the South and Southwest, have
enacted anti-violence statutes. 0 7 Six states achieve a similar result by
prohibiting such conduct as an employee unfair labor practice. °8 An indication of the degree of protection which some state legislatures have
sought to give to non-union workers can be had from a glance at the following Nebraska statute:
It is unlawful for any person or persons, singly or by conspiring together, to interfere, or attempt to interfere with another person in the exercise of his or her lawful
right to work, or to enter upon or pursue any lawful employment he or she may desire by doing any of the following acts: i) using profane, insulting, indecent, offensive,
annoying, abusive or threatening language toward such person or any member of his
or her immediate family, or in his, her or their presence, or hearing for the purpose of
inducing or influencing, or attempting to induce or influence, such person to quit his
or her employment, or to refrain from seeking or freely entering into employment, or
by persisting in talking to or communicating in any manner with such person or members of his or her immediate family against his, her or their will, for such purpose; 2)
following or intercepting such person from or to his work, from or to his home or
lodging, or about the city, against the will of such person, for such purpose; 3) photographing such person against his will; 4) menacing, threatening, coercing, intimidating
or frightening in any manner, such person for such purp6se; 5) committing an assault
or assault and battery upon such person for such purpose; or 6) loitering about, picketing or patroling the place of work or residence of such person, or any street, alley, road,
highway, or any other place, where such person may be, or in the vicinity thereof, for
such purpose, against the will of such person."' 9
X05
Wash. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 2382(5).
"x Ala., Ark., Colo., Del., Fla., Ga., Kan., Mich., Minn., Miss., Neb., Pa., Tex., Utah, Va.,
and Wis.
Crim. L. 7,
"o7Ala. Gen. Acts (1943) 256, § 9; Ark. Stat. Ann. (Pope, Supp. i944) Part IH,
§§ 1-2; Del. L. (1947) c. 196, §§ 2(a), 4(a); Fla. Gen. L. (i943) c. 21968, § 9(i)(9), (ii);
Ga. L. (i947) No. 141, §§ i, 6; La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart., Supp. I947) § 4379.22(a); Mich.
Pub. Acts (i947) No. 297, c. 5I, § 352, 2o L.R.R.M. 3097; Neb. Rev. Stat. (i943) § 28-812;
Miss. Code Ann. (1942) § 2126; Tex. Ann. Pen. Code (Vernon, Supp. 1946) art. 1621b, § i,
Va. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) § 4711a.

X0sColo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, § 94(6) (2) (a), (b), (f); Kan. L. (i943) c. 191,
§ 8(14); Minn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.11(7); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43,
§211.6(2)(a); Utah L. (i947) H.B. 36, §49-I-I6(2)(a); Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943)
§ iii.O6(2) (a).
109
Neb. Rev. Stat. (i943) § 28-812.
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An amendment to the Pennsylvania act makes it an unfair labor practice for an employee or a labor organization to intimidate, restrain or coerce any employee for the purpose of compelling him to join or refrain
from joining any labor organization, or for the purpose of influencing his
selection of representatives for collective bargaining.""° Previously such
action was an unfair labor practice only if accompanied by threats of
force or violence.
PICKETING AND RELATED STRIKE ACTIVITY

Even though the Thornhill doctrine was itself enunciated in a sweeping
decision holding unconstitutional an Alabama anti-picketing statute, on
the theory that picketing is a form of freedom of speech, the states have
continued in attempts to regulate various aspects of picketing.
Five states permit picketing only if a majority of the employees have
voted in favor of a strike."' Thus, Wisconsin in 1939 declared it to be an
unfair labor practice for any person "to cooperate in engaging in, promoting or inducing picketing, boycotting or any other overt concomitant of a
strike unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the employees of
an employer against whom such acts are primarily directed have voted by
secret ballot to call a strike'hz In 1943, Wisconsin, in an obvious bow
to the Supreme Court, inserted the following after the word "picketing"
in the above sentence: "(not constituting an exercise of constitutionally
guaranteed free speech)." Picketing is prohibited in Missouri and South
Dakota in the absence of a labor dispute between the employer and his
employees.Y 3 South Dakota by statute prohibits picketing accompanied
by force or violence14-as have many states and municipalities for decades.
Mass picketing has been specifically prohibited by legislation in thirteen states. A 1946 Virginia statute declares unlawful "picketing by force
or violence, or to picket alone or in concert with others in such manner as
to obstruct or interfere with free ingress and egress to and from any
6
premises."' A similar result is achieved by provisions in Colorado,"
""Pa.L. (1947) No. 558, § 6(2)(a).
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, § 94(6)(2)(e); Del. L. (1947) c. 196, § 2(e);
N.D. L. (I947) H.B. i6o, § 12 (subject to referendum); Utah L. (r947) H.B. 36, § 49-1-16
(2)(c); Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § iii.o6(2)(e).
1'Wis.
Stat. (Brossard, z943) § iii.o6(2)(e).
113 Mo. L. (1947) S.B. 79, § 8; S.D. L. (1947) c. 93, 2A C.C.H. Lab. L. Serv. 46,402-3.
"Z4S.D. L. (1947) C. 93, 2A C.C.H. Lab. L. Serv. 46, 402-3.

"is Va. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) § 471ia.
x16 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1944) c. 97, § 9 4(6)(2)(f).
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Delaware,"17 Florida,"18 Georgia,"Il Kansas,'2 0 Louisiana,"' Michigan,'
6
' 5
Minnesota,' 2 3 South Dakota," 4 Texas, 1 Utah"1 and Wisconsin."7 But

what is mass picketing? The South Dakota statute defines it as "picketing
by a greater number than five per cent of the first one hundred striking or
locked out employees of the picketed employer and one per cent of the
employees in excess of this number .. ... ,,18 In Texas, mass picketing
means any form of picketing in which there are more than two pickets at
9
one time within 5o feet of any entrance to the premises being picketedY.
Minnesota has also limited the number of pickets, by making it an unfair
labor practice "for more than one person to picket or cause to be picketed
a single entrance 'to
' °any place of employment where no strike is in progI3
ress at the tim e.

Stranger picketing has been the object of frequent legislative attack. A
1947 South Dakota statute declares that "it shall be unlawful for any
person not a bona fide employee of the picketed employer to act as a picket."'' Pennsylvania' 3' and Virginia 3- have similar statutes. Minnesota
permits stranger picketing during a strike only where "the majority of
persons engaged in picketing the place of employment at these times are
employees of the place of employment."'34 Stranger picketing, where no
labor dispute exists between the immediate employer and his employees
and where the employees have not voted to strike, has been held to be an
unfair labor practice in Wisconsin,13- and would presumably be the same
under identically-worded provisions in the Colorado, 6 and Utah 37 acts.
119 Ga. L. (1947) No. 141, §§ 3, 6.
zr7 Del. L. (1947) C.i96, § 2(0.
XX8
Fla.
12xLa.

Gen. L. (1943) C. 21968, §§ 9(9), (i).
220 Kan. L. (1943) c. i9i, § 8(i6).
Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, Supp. i947) § 4379.22(a).

Mich. Pub. Acts (1947) No. 318, § 9f.
Minn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.13(1).

"
"3

24S.D.

L. (1947)

C.

93, §§ i-6, 2A C.C.H. Lab. L. Serv. 46, 402-3.

Tex. L. (1947) c. 138.

22s

Utah L. (i947) H.B. 36, § 49-I-16(2)(d).
Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § iii.o6(2)(f).
120 Minn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.11(5).
126

129

27

129

'31

'32

S.D. L. (1947) C. 93, § 5Tex. L. (i947) c. 138.

S.D. L. (i947) C.93, § I,2A C.C.H. Lab. L. Serv. 46, 402.
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 194) tit. 43, § 21i.6(2)(a), (c).

Va. Code Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) § 471Ia.
Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.11(4).
"SMatter of Salamone, W.E.R.B. Dec. No. 8i (i94o).
136 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, § 94(6)(2)(e).
'37 Utah L. (1947) H.B. 36, § 49-i-6(2) (c).
133

'34Minn.
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An Oregon statutel' s prohibiting stranger picketing, it may also be noted,
was held to be unconstitutional. 39
A few states protect a special class from the inconvenience of picketing,
as in Idaho,140 South Dakota' 4' and Minnesota 42 which have granted special protection to agricultural premises. The Idaho statute provided that
"No person shall picket upon any ranch, farm, feed yard, shearing plant,
processing plant or other agricultural premises ..... ,,143
The picketing of a worker's home has been banned in eight states. Five
states-Colorado,144 Delaware, 45 Utah 46 and Wisconsin' 47-outlaw such
picketing as an unfair labor practice. A Kansas statute makes it illegal to
intimidate a worker's family, "picket his domicile or injure the person or
property of such employee or his family.' ' z 4 Conne6ticut,"49 Michigans °
and Nebraska 3 ' also have enacted comparable statutes.
Minnesota in 1945 prohibited picketing, strikes or boycotts designed to
upset a valid certification, subjecting the obstreperous union to a suit for
damages. 5 2 This is the type of situation in which a minority union seeks
to force the employer to recognize it as collective bargaining representative for the employees in a unit for which another union has been certified
as the bargaining agent. Another approach to the same problem is found
in statutes in Pennsylvania s3 and Delaware 5 4 which in effect authorize injunctions to issue under such circumstances. Still a third solution to the
problem is available in Wisconsin,'-" Colorado s6 and Delaware'6 7 which
make such conduct an unfair labor practice.
Comp. Laws Ann. (I940) § 102--908.
139 AFL v. Bain, x65 Ore. 183, io6 P. 2d 544 (194o); cf. AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1940).
X40 Idaho L. (1943) C. 76, §§ 3, 4. Held unconstitutional in AFL v. Langley, 168 P. 2d 831
139Ore.

(Idaho, 1946).
141 S.D. L. (1943) c. 86, § 3. Held unconstitutional in part in AFL v. Mickelson, 9 C.C.H.
Lab. Cas. 67,o64 (S.D. Cir. Ct., 1944).
142 Minn. Stat. (Henderson, i945) § 179.i1(9).

'43

Idaho L. (1943) c. 76,

§§ 3, 4.

Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946)
x4SDel. L. (1947) C. 196, § 2a.
'44

C.

97, § 94(6)(2)(a).

146

Utah L. (1947) H.B. 36, § 49-I-6(2)(a).

147

Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § x i.o6(2) (a).

Kan. L. (z943) c. 191 § 8(x4).
Conn. Spec. L. (I947) No. 123, 20 L.R.R.M. 3059.
SO
Mich. Pub. Acts (1947) No. 318, § 9f.
%s'Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) § 28-812.
"SMinn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.27.
's4 Del. L. (i947) c. 196, § 1(1)(4).
'53 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 2o6d.
"SsWis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § ixi.o6(2)(d).
Is6 Col. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1944) C. 97, § 94 (6)(2)(d).
"s7 Del. L. (1947) c. i96, § 2(d).
148
149
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It seems apparent that when the Supreme Court passes upon much of
the state anti-picketing legislation discussed in this section it will be invalidated unless the Court decides to abandon entirely the much-battered
Thornhill doctrine.
BOYCOTTS

Secondary boycotts have been subjected to rigorous legislative attack
59
s
Colorado,160 Delaware, 16'
in fourteen states-Alabama,' California,
6
6
Idaho, 62 Iowa, 63 Minnesota,64 Missouri," s North Dakota,' Oregon, 7
Pennsylvania, 68 Texas, 69 Utah 70 and Wisconsin."'7 The majority-the
so-called "hot cargo" statutes-prohibit the refusal by persons not directly concerned in the labor dispute to handle or work on non-union-made
materials or supplies. A few statutes are more comprehensive, proscribing
all secondary boycotts, which was the general rule at common law. The
1947 Minnesota statute outlawed any secondary boycott as "an illegal
combination in restraint of trade and in violation of the public policy of
this state."' 172 Earlier, Minnesota,"73 as well as Idaho, 74 South Dakota'e 7 s
and Oregon," 76 had legislated to protect agriculture from interference
through the secondary boycott. Such protection was made ambulatory,
extending to the protection of food even during processing and marketing.
The latter three statutes were, however, subsequently held to be uncon77
stitutional, as were the "hot cargo" acts in Alabama and California.
Under the North Dakota law, secondary boycotts and sympathy strikes
8

zs Ala. Gen. Acts (1943) 256, § 12. Invalidated in AFL v. McAdory, 246 Ala. 1, 18 So. 2d

81o (1944).
159Cal. Stat. (i947) C. 278. Invalidated in Ex parte Blaney, 184 P. 2d 892 (Cal., 1947).
"6oColo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, § 94(6)(2)(g).
16,Del. L. (i947) c. z96, §§ 2(g), 6.
62Idaho L. (1947) C. 265, i9 L.R.R.M. 3o50.
163Iowa Acts (x947) C. 297, § I, 2o L.R.R.M. 3012.
x64Minn.

2o L.R.R.M. 30X2.

165Mo.

20

6

L. (1947) C. 486, § 4,
L. (i947) S.B. 79, § 8,

L.R.R.M. 3o93.

N.D. L. (1947) H.B. 16o, § 13.

Ore. L. (1947) c. 356, 2o L.R.R.M.' 3oo 3 .
69
"Tex. L. (1947) c. 387, 20 L.R.R.M. 3o9o.
67

'70

68Pa.

L. (1947) No. 558, § 6(2)(d).

Utah L. (I947) c. 66, § 49-1-16(2)(e).

17'Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § iii.o6(2)(g).

'72

Minn. L. (I947) c. 486, § 4.

173Minn. Stat. (Henderson, X945) § 179.11(9).
'74 Idaho L. (1943) C. 76,
831 (1946).

§§ 3,

4. Invalidated in AFL v. Langley, 66 Idaho 763, i68 P. 2d

17SS.D. L. (1943) c. 86, § 3.
176 Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. (194o)

§ 102-907. Invalidated in AFL v. Bain, i65 Ore. 183,

io6 P. 2d 544 (i94o).
77See

cases cited notes 141, 158, 159, 174 and 176, supra.
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are declared to be against public policy and illegal." 5 They are made subject to injunctive relief as well as suits for damages. In Massachusetts boycotts are unlawful when used to force the commission of an unfair labor
9
practice.Y
STRIKES

Even though it has been generally assumed since the Wolff case,11 that
the right to strike cannot be entirely banned, a number of states have enacted legislation limiting the right in certain respects.
Some states have set up certain procedural requirements which the
union must meet prior to a strike. Eleven states have passed laws making
strikes illegal unless approved by a majority vote prior to the walkout.
They are Alabama,' 8' Colorado,' 82 Delaware,' 83 Florida 8 4 Kansas,'8 s
Louisiana,'86 Minnesota, x8' Missouri, 8" North Dakota,'8 9 Oregon, 9°
Utah 9' and Wisconsin. 9' The Florida statute provides that it shall be unlawful for any person "to participate in any strike, walk-out, or cessation
of work or continuation thereof without the same being authorized by a
majority vote of the employees to be governed thereby; provided, that
this shall not prohibit any person from terminating his employment of his
'
The purposes of such legislation are said to be, first, to
own volition.""'
provide some assurance to the employer and the majority of the employees in the bargaining unit that their working agreement will not be disrupted by a dissident minority; second, to assure both to the employer and
to the employees that strikes will not be called by irresponsible labor leaders without consulting the membership; and, third, possibly to delay the
calling of a strike so as to afford additional time for settlement of the dis,,8 N.D.L. (1947) C. 242, §1.

19 Mass. Acts (1947) c. i5oA, § 4A(2) (a).
780 Wolff Packing Co. v. Kansas, 262 U.S. 522 (1923), 267 U.S. 552 (1925).
18sAla.

Gen. Acts

(1943) 257, § 13.

192
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) C. 97, § 94(6) (2) (e).
183Del. L. (1947) c. 196, § 2(e)
184Fla. Gen. L. (I943) C. 21968, § 9(3).
aSKan. L. (1943) c. 191, § 8(3).

t86
La. Acts (1946) Act No. 18o, § 3(b). The statute merely provides that a strike must be
authorized by the labor organization. It is not clear whether the union leadership can authorize
a strike in the absence of a vote.
1s7Minn. Stat. (Henderson,

'945)

§ 179.11(8).

'89N.D. L. (i947) C. 242, § II.
18 9Mo. L. (1947) S.B. 79, § 3I9oOre. Comp. Laws Ann. (i94o) § I02-9o6. Invalidated in AFL v. Bain, 31 Ore. 87, io6
P. d S44
(
rF4o).
x9r
Utah L. (1947) c. 66, § 49-1-16(2) (c).

192Wis. star. (Brossard, 1943) § 1ii .o6(2) (e).

193Fla. Gen. L. (1943) C. 21968, §9(3).
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pute or to enable the employer to be better able to withstand the disruption when it occurs.
One of the frequent devices used to avert strikes has been the coolingoff period (which in operation could perhaps be more aptly termed a heating-up period). Prior to the 1947 legislative sessions, six states required
such a period under certain circumstances before a strike could legally
take place. 9 4 This was sometimes done in the hopes that a settlement
could be effectuated in the interim, but when, for example, Wisconsin
passed a statute which required a ten-day notice to strike in agricultural
industries,195 the purpose seems clearly to have been to prevent a union
coup d'6tat which could result from the perishable nature of the commod,ities involved. Colorado requires a twenty-day strike notice in all except
agricultural industries, where ten additional days are required."96 A few
states simply require notification to the employer or state department of
labor that a strike is impending. Violations are generally made misdemeanors, punishable by fine or imprisonment.
The attention of the 1947 legislators was directed to the problem of
strikes in essential industries because of the great shut-downs which followed the coal strike of 1946. As a result special legislation was enacted in
ten states to regulate industrial disputes between public utilities and their
employees. 97 All of these laws contain restrictions on strikes and provide
severe penalties for violations. The laws of Florida,"9s Indiana,' 99 Michigan, 0° Nebraska,2' New Jersey, 2 PennsylvaniaF°3 and Wisconsin"04 establish machinery for compulsory arbitration. In Florida, for example, after
an impasse is reached in collective bargaining between a public utility and
its employees, either party can petition the governor, who may appoint a
conciliator to attempt settlement of the dispute. The conciliator has 45
days in which to effect a settlement. During this period neither a strike nor
a lockout is permissible. At the end of this period if no settlement has been
"94 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, § 94(11)(2); Ga. L. (194I) No. 293, §§ 3, 4;
Ky. Rev. Stat. (Cullen, 1946) § 336.150; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. 1946) § x7.454-9;
Minn. Stat. (Henderson, i945) § 179.o6; Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § 111.11(2).
19SWis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § 1iv.ix(2).
196Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, § 94(11)(2).
197Fla., Ind., Mass., Mich., Mo., Neb., N.J., Pa., Tex., Va., and Wis.
198 Fla. Gen. L. (1947) C. 23911; 2A C.C.H. Lab. L. Serv. 42,101-2.

;99 Ind. Acts (1947) C. 341.
200 Mich. Pub. Acts (I947) No. 318.
2oNeb. L. (1947) L.B. 537
202 N.J. Acts (1946) C. 38, as amended by cc. 47 and 75 of N.J. Acts (i947).
20 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1947) tit. 213, § 8.
204 Wis. L. (1947) c. 414, § 111-55.
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reached, and if "the Governor believes that a continuation of the dispute
will cause or is likely to cause the interruption of the supply of a service
on which the affected community is so dependent that severe hardship
would be inflicted on a substantial number of persons by a cessation of
service, he shall appoint a Board of Arbitration to hear and determine
'' °
such dispute. 2 S
In Missouri,20 Massachusetts,207 New Jersey °S and Virginia,209 the
governor is authorized to take over and operate the plant or facility if the
parties cannot effect a settlement. These same four states prohibit strikes,
and Nebraska bans both strikes and lock-outs after a public utility has
been taken over by the state.2 10 It is also generally provided that no strike
or lock-out shall take place during mediation or arbitration proceedings.
Picketing of the premises of a public utility is unlawful in Texas and may
be enjoined.21' The Virginia act specifically prohibits picketing after the
governor has taken possession of a utiity.r2 Most of the laws provide severe penalties for violations. In Florida, Missouri and Virginia, a lock-out
or strike subjects the utility or the union to a penalty up to $io,ooo for
each day of interruption of service. And any violation of the act by a union member acting in concert with others, or by any other individual, can
result in imprisonment. In Florida, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Jersey and Pennsylvania, injunctions may be issued to enforce an order of
an arbitration board.
A number of states have sought to cope with the problem of strikes in
violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Legislation passed has been
of three types. First, a specific exception is made in the anti-injunction
act, as in Pennsylvania,213 to permit injunctions to issue in cases where a
strike has been called in violation of a collective bargaining agreement.
Second, laws have been enacted declaring such strikes illegal, and authorizing suit for damages or for an injunctionm24 Third, Colorado,215 MinneFla. Gen. L. (i947) C. 23911, 2A C.C.H. Lab. L. Serv.
L. (947) H.B. i8o.
207 Mass. Acts (1947) c. 596, § 4(b)(x).
208 N.J. Acts (1946) c. 38; N.J. Acts (1947) cc. 47, 75.
20
Va. Acts (1947) C.9.
20S

42,101-2.

6

20 Mo.

2- Neb. L. (1947) L.B. 537.

21,
Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1947) art. 14462, §§ 3-4.
212 Va. L. (i947) C. 9.
213Pa. L. (i943) No. 163, § 4(a).
214Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. x946) C. 97, § 94(22) (I). Del. L. (i947) H.B. 212, § 8;
Mo. L. (94i) S.B. 79, § 5; S.D. L. (1947) S.B. 225, § 2; Tex. L. (i947) H.B. 73; N.D. L.
(1947) H.B. i6o, § 8 (subject to referendum); La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, Supp. 1947)
§ 4379.20; Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1941), § 1126 (labor code).
21S Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) C. 97, § 94(6) (2) (c).
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sota" 6 and Wisconsin"7 have made participation in such strikes an employee urifair labor practice.
The sit-down strike, once characterized by the Supreme Court as "a
'2
high-handed proceeding without shadow of legal right,' 2I
has been pro21 9
scribed by statute in fourteen states. Strikes by public employees are
prohibited by laws enacted in 1947 in Michigan,220 Missouri,-' New
York,2 22 Ohio, 2 3 Pennsylvania224 and Texas.2 Most of these laws provide
that a violation of the act will result in termination of employment and
deprivation of governmental employment rights. In Missouri, a public
employee who engages in a strike is guilty of a misdemeanor.22 6 Minnesota forbids strikes or lock-outs in charitable hospitals." 7
JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES

A jurisdictional dispute usually involves a controversy between two or
more labor organizations over the right of representation or jurisdiction
over particular work. Laws regulating or prohibiting strikes in connection
9
with jurisdictional disputes have been enacted in California,-' Florida,2
Kansas,230 Massachusetts,231 Michigan,232 Minnesota,233 Missouri, 23 4 Oregon,23 5 Pennsylvania236 and Wisconsin.237 The Florida statute makes it un216 Minn.

Stat. (Henderson, i945) § 179.11().
217 Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § i11.o6(2)(c).
218NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 3o6 U.S. 240, 252 (i939).
219 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, §
9 4 (6)(2)(i); Del. L. (1947) c. 196, 2(H);
Fla. Gen. L. (1943) C. 21968, § 9(7); Kan. L. (1943) c. 191, § 13; La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart,
Supp. 1947) § 4379.22(b); Md. Ann. Code (Flack, Supp. 1943) art. 27, § 24A; Mass. Ann.
Laws (1942) c. i5oa, § 4 A; Mich. Stat. Ann. (Henderson, Supp. 1946) § i7-454-i5; Minn.
Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.I1 (3); Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 2xi.6(2)(b);
Utah L. (1947) H.B. 36, § 49-i-i6(2)(f); Vt. Acts (i937) No. 21o, at 251; Wash. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (Remington, 1932) § 2563-4; Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § iii.o6 (2)(h).
-20Mich. Pub. Acts (i947) No. 336, 2o L.R.R.M. 3095.
- Mo. L. (1947) S.B. 79, § 7, 2o L.R.R.M. 3093.
N.Y. L. (1947) C. 391, 2o L.R.R.M. 3ooi.
=3 20 L.R.R.M. 3072 (1947).
24 20 L.R.R.M. 3o65 (1947).
27 Minn. L. (1947) c. 335, 2o L.R.R.M. 3013.
S 2o L.R.R.M. 3014 (1947).
28 Cal. Stat. (1947) c. r388, 2o L.R.R.M. 3077.

Mo. L. (i947) S.B. 79, § 7.

=9 Fla. Gen. L. (1943) C. 21968, § 9(10).
Kan. L. (i943) c. x91, § 8(13). Held unconstitutional in Stapleton v. Mitchell, 6o F.
Supp. 51 (Kan,.1945)
23. Mass. Acts (1947) c. 657, § 5(c).
232 Mich. Pub. Acts (i947) No. 318, § 9c.
233 Minn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.083.
234Mo. L. (1947) S.B. 79, § 6(2).
23sOre. Comp. Laws Ann. (1940),
§102-906. Invalidated in AFL v. Bain, 165 Ore. x83,
io6 P. 2d 544 (i94o).
226Pa. L. (1947) Act No. 558, § 6(2)(1).
237Wis. L. (1947) c. 530, § 11i.o6 (2)(e).
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lawful "to interfere with work by reason of any jurisdictional dispute,
grievance or disagreement between or with a labor organization." Minnesota's approach is more constructive, for not only does it prohibit a jurisdictional strike, but a procedure is provided for settlement of such disputes. After the state's labor conciliator has certified a jurisdictional dispute to him, the governor is empowered at his discretion-unless the parties agree to some form of private arbitration-to appoint a "labor referee"
to resolve the controversy "in accordance with the proper construction of
the agreement or of the provisions of the charters of the contending organizations, or, in the absence of such guides, in a way that will promote industrial peace." After a referee has been appointed to settle a jurisdictional dispute, any strike, picketing or boycotting arising out of the dispute
becomes unlawful. Pennsylvania,238 Colorado 3 9 and California 240 permit
the issuance of an injunction under such circumstances, and, in addition,
California permits the recovery of damages incurred. Michigan41 and
Massachusetts42 provide for voluntary settlement, but, in the latter state,
after the parties have submitted an issue to arbitration and one of them
fails to comply with the terms of the award, an injunction may be obtained to prevent a strike, picketing, boycott, or other concerted interference against an employer. The Missouri law provides that the parties
have the duty to settle, if necessary by arbitration, and where they fail to
follow this procedure, the industrial commission, upon application of any
of the parties, may make a binding determination of the dispute.243 Participation in a jurisdictional strike is made an unfair labor practice in
Pennsylvania44 and Wisconsin.241
CONTRACT RESPONSIBILITY
At common law a union, as a voluntary, unincorporated association,
could neither sue nor be sued in its own name. Only the members of the
union, as individuals, were subject to judicial proceedings. Much has been
made of the fact that an employer, who entered a collective bargaining
agreement, has often been unable to sue the contracting union for breach
of contract because the labor organization was not recognized as a legal
entity. A number of states have by statute sought to improve this situation. Three states have included provisions in their labor relations acts
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 2o6(a)(b).
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) C. 97, §§ 94(2)(7), (I6).
240 Cal. Stat. (1947) C. 1388, 2o L.R.R.M. 3077.
24X Mich. Pub. Acts (i947) No. 318, § 9c.
242 Mass. Acts (1947) C. 571.
244 Pa. L. (i947) No. 558, § 6(2)(e).
243 Mo. L. (1947) S.B. 79, § 2(I).
24sWis. L. (947) c. 530, § xix.o6(2)(1).
238
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making it an unfair labdr practice for either an employer or an employee
to violate a collective bargaining agreement. 246 The Delaware law, however, makes it an unfair labor practice only for employees to do So. 47 In
addition to extensive legislation resulting from a change from the English
concept that a collective bargaining agreement is not enforceable at law,
thirteen states have indirectly legislated on this problem by specifically providing for the suability of unions under certain circumstances.24 8
For example, the Louisiana statute provides: "Both labor organization
and employer shall be bound by the acts of its duly authorized agents and
may sue or be sued as an entity and in behalf of those whom they represent in the courts of the State of Louisiana, provided, that any money
judgment against such labor organization, whether under this section or
otherwise, shall be enforced only against the organization as an entity and
against its assets and funds, and shall not be enforceable against the property of an individual member.' ' 2 49 The California statute provides more
directly for contract responsibility, in these words: "Any collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a labor organization shall be
enforceable at law or in equity and a breach of such collective agreement
by any party thereto shall be subject to the same remedies, including injunctive relief, as are available on other contracts in the courts of this
state.''2 5° A frequently-found provision in state suability statutes specifies
that unions are responsible for the actions of their authorized representatives.25 Under the Texas law a union whose members engage in picketing
or a strike are liable for damages in the event such picketing or strike is
22
held to be a breach of contract.
The broad provision for suability in federal courts incorporated in the
Taft-Hartley Act253 is likely to obviate the need for state legislation in
this regard.
A generation or so ago there was a considerable demand that unions
should be required to incorporate. With the recent trend toward permit046 Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, §§ 94(6) (2)(c), (22)(i); Minn. Stat. (Henderson, x945) § 179.II(l); Wis. Stat. (Brossard, 1943) § zii.o6(2)(c).
247 Del. L. (I947) H.B. 212, § 2(c).
248Ariz. L. (1947) c. 81, § 6; Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 194) § 1126 (labor code); Del. L,
(1947) H.B. 212, § 8; Fla. Gen. L. (1943) c. 21968, § ii; Kan. L. (1943) c. 1g1, § io; La. Gen.
Stat. Ann. (Dart, Supp. x947) § 4379.20; Minn. L. (1947) C. 527, 2o L.R.R.M. 30o9; Neb. L.
(1947) L.B. 276, 2o L.R.R.M. 3o67; N.C. L. (1947) C. 328, § 6, i 9 L.R.R.M. 3036; N.D. L.

(1947) H.B. x6o, § 8 (subject to approval at referendum); S.D. L. (1947) S.B. 225, § i; Tex. L.
(i947) H.B. 73, § I, 20 L.R.R.M. 317; Va. L. (947) H.B. 5, c. 2, § 6, 39 L.R.R.M. 3023.
249 La. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Dart, Supp. 1947) § 4379.20.
350 Cal. Gen. Laws (Deering, 1941) § 1126 (labor code).
e.g., Del. L. (1947) C. 196, § 8.
-5'Tex. L. (1947) H.B. 73, § z.
- Labor-Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 185 (1947).

25, See,
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ting suits for damages to be brought against unions, little more than an
echo of the movement for compulsory incorporation has survived. This
was in Colorado where such a statute was enacted in 1943; but it was subsequently held to be unconstitutional on the ground that incorporation is
a voluntary act, and, as applied here, the provision deprived unions and
their members of their liberty and their civil rights without due process of
2 4
law, in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS

In response to increasing interest in political action by unions, five
states,2 s5 as well as the federal governments 6 have prohibited political contributions by labor organizations. The Texas statute declares that "It
shall be unlawful for any labor union to make a financial contribution to
any political party or person running for political office.' ' S7 The Delaware
act specifically includes within the prohibition not only the making of
such contributions, but also the soliciting of funds by a union for political
purposes. But, on the other hand, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that an initiative measure prohibiting political activity by
labor unions would be unconstitutional if enacted.251 Accordingly, the
petition was not submitted to a vote of the electorate.
THE REGULATION OF LABOR UNIONS
Increasing legislative interest has been manifest in recent years not
only in the methods used by unions, but also in the labor organization itself. Thus, statutes have been enacted providing for registration and financial reports, the regulation of union elections and membership practices,
and the registration or licensing of union agents.
UNION REGISTRATION AND FINANCIAL REPORTS

Eleven states have adopted statutes requiring some type of registration259 The Alabama statute is typical. It requires the filing of the followS4AFL v. Reilly, 113 Colo. 9o, 155 P. 2d 145 (I944), holding unconstitutional Colo. Stat.
Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) c. 97, § 94 (20).
-sAla. Gen. Acts (1943) No. 298, § 17, at 258, invalidated on procedural grounds in
AFL v. McAdory, 246 Ala. z, 18 So. 2d 8io (i944); Colo.Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) C.97,
§ 94(20) (4) (c), invalidated because an earlier provision in the section was held to be unconstitutional; Del. L. (947) c. i96, § 23; Pa. L. (i943) No. 358; Tex. L. (1943) c. 104, § 4(b).
256 Labor-Management Relations Act, 2 U.S.C.A. § 251.
257 Tex. L. (i943) c. 104, § 4(b).
2ssBowe v. Commonwealth, 69 N.E. 2d 115 (Mass., 1946).
59 Ala. Gen. Acts (1043) 255, § 7; Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) C. 97, § 94(20) (1)
(invalidated); Del. L. (i947) c. i96, §§ I1-X2; Fla. Gen. L. (i943) c. 21968, §§4, io; Idaho Laws
(943) c. 76, § i, invalidated on procedural grounds in AFL v. Langley, 66 Idaho 763, i68 P.
2d 831 (1946); Kan. L. (943) c. 19i,§ 5(3); Mass., 2A C.C.H. Lab. L. Serv. 43,575; N.H. L.
(1947) C. 194, § 21-b (applies only to unions with union-security contracts); N.D. L. (1947)
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ing information annually with the state department of labor: i) the name
of the labor organization, the location of its principal office and its offices
of the state; 2) the names and addresses of its officers and business agents,
together with the salaries and other remuneration paid each; 3) the date
of regular election of officers and the number of its paid-up members; 4)
a complete financial statement of all fees, dues, fines or assessments levied
and received, together with an itemized list of all disbursements, with
names of recipients and purpose thereof, covering the preceding twelve
months; 5) a complete statement of all property owned by the labor organization, including any monies on hand or accredited2 60
One of the reasons which unions have given for opposing such statutes
is that if the employer is able to obtain a statement of the union's financial resources, he will then be better able to break a strike by coldly calculating how long the union will be able to hold out. As regards secrecy
requirements, Texas and Delaware make such reports available only to
state officers and commissions; Alabama, in addition, makes the reports
available to members of the union; but Florida, Kansas, Massachusetts
and North Dakota specify that such reports shall be available for public
inspection, while Idaho, South Dakota and Utah are silent upon the availability of the reports. The information required for registration in Utah
is not, however, of a confidential nature. New Hampshire requires a financial report only when the union has entered into a union-security contract
with the employer. Minnesota and Wisconsin require the officers to furnish financial statements to all union members. Delaware, Florida and
Texas require that account books be open to inspection by union members at reasonable times.
REGULATION OF UNION ELECTIONS

The Minnesota Labor Union Democracy Act of i94326, sets out its own

justification in this excerpt from its preamble:
Whereas it is well recognized that the majority of labor unions are organized and
operated upon democratic principles so that their officers and representatives are
responsible and responsive to their members, and
Whereas disregard of democratic principles in the case of some unions has resulted
in a denial of the rights of their members and in labor disputes and controversies affecting the public interest, and
Whereas undemocratic organization or operation of labor unions is inimical to the
best interests of the members thereof and is contrary to the public welfare: . ..
H.B. x6o, §§ 2-3 (subject to approval at referendum); S.D. L. (943) c. 86, § i; Tex. Ann. Rev.
Civ. Stat. (Vernon, Supp. 1946) tit. 83, art. 5154a, § 3.
26o Ala. Gen. Acts (1943) 255, § 7.
26xMinn. Stat. (Henderson, 1945) § 179.I9-20.
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The act which follows requires unions to hold elections at least every four
years by secret ballot and after reasonable notice. In addition, Delawaredz
and TexasS3 have comparable requirements. However, the Texas law2S4
requiring annual union elections was held invalid because its exceptions
were deemed discriminatory.S5 Delaware requires certification of the election results by a disinterested person and permits anyone dissatisfied to
petition a court of equity for a review of the entire proceeding.211
REGISTRATION, LICENSINXG OR OTHER RESTRICTIONS ON UNION AGENTS

Florida 17and KansasFSS have enacted statutes requiring the licensing of
paid union representatives. The Florida law, in addition to the requirement that applicants be citizens of the United States, provides that no
license shall be issued to one who has been convicted of a felony, or who
is not a person of good moral character. A Texas statute requires that all
paid union organizers must obtain, in advance of solicitation, an organizer's card from the Secretary of State.269 Issuance of a license is discretionary with state officials only in Florida;270 in Texas and Kansas it is
mandatory. In Alabama filing by the union of the required annual report
with the state is a condition precedent to the lawful collection of "dues,
assessments, or any other monies from any member" by an officer or
agent of the labor organization. 7'
RACIAL AND RELIGIOUS DISCRIINATION

State legislatures have attacked the problem of discrimination in many
ways. Laws in Connecticut, 72 Massachusetts, 73 New Jersey 274 and New
York27s now make it illegal for any union or employer to discriminate
262Del.

L. (i943) c. 146, § 21.
Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stats. (Vernon, Supp. 1946) tit. 83, art. 5154a, § 4a.
264 Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stats. (Vernon, Supp. 1946) tit. 83, art. 5i54a, § 3.
6
2 S AFL v. Mann, 188 S.W. 2d 276 (Tex. Civ. App., 1945).
266 Del. L. (i947) c. i96, § ig.
267 Fla. Gen. L. (1943) C. 21968, §§ 4, 10.
263

Kan. L. (2943) c. x91, § 5(3).
269 Tex. Ann. Rev. Civ. Stats. (Vernon, Supp. 1946) tit. 83, art. 5154a, § 3. The licensing
26

provision was held to be unconstitutional as applied to a speech soliciting membership.
Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 5z6 (1944).
270 This section was invalidated insofar as it applied to employees who fall within the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act. Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 0944).
271 Ala. Gen. Acts (1943) 255, § 7.

272 Conn. Spec. L. 0I947) P.A. 171.
273 Mass. Acts (1946) c. 368.

274 N.J. Rev. Stat. (Supp. 1945) tit. z8, c. 25, § I8.25-12(b).
27SN.Y. L. (1943) c. 118, art. 12.
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against an employee because of his race, color or creed, and they provide
means for enforcement through administrative agencies. Kansas 76 and
Nebraska277 deny collective bargaining privileges to unions which so discriminate. A union practicing racial discrimination cannot in Pennsyl78
vania qualify as a labor organization under the state labor relations act.2
Wisconsin has lodged in its industrial commission the power to investigate
the existence, character, causes and extent of discrimination, but the commission is given no powers of compulsion.279 The Colorado Labor Peace
Act of 194 3 declares that "No person shall be denied membership in a labor organization or union on account of race, color, religion, sex or by any
unjust discrimination. ' 210 However, no specific penalties are set forth.
The above sets out the chief explicit controls of labor relations and union organization and activities appearing in state laws during the last ten
years. While the control sought is not by any means all new, this analysis
indicates which way the wind has been blowing in various parts of the
United States. It is still too early to observe the effect of restrictive statutes on union development and the collective bargaining process, but in
light of the prevalence of such legislation, it remains a vital question. The
Taft-Hartley Act will of course tend to make the pattern of restrictive
statutes more nearly uniform, but in many vital areas of union control
some of the state statutes go well beyond the federal act. In the meantime, how much of the state legislation will survive court tests and our experience in the realm of labor-management relations remains to be seen.
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Kan. Gen. Stat. (Corrick, Supp. i94I), § 44-8o.

277 Neb. Rev. Stat. (i943) § 48-214.
278 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, Supp. 1946) tit. 43, § 2r1.3 (f).

L. (1945) 861, c. 49o , § 111.35.
Colo. Stat. Ann. (Michie, Supp. 1946) C. 97, § 94(I)(4).
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